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Law, Democracy and the Quality of Government in Africa
Abstract
This paper examines the big questions of African comparative politics.  It assesses the 
interaction of three crucial components in the development of the continent: law, democracy and 
quality of government. Political regimes of democracy, polity and autocracy are instrumented 
with income-levels, legal-origins, religious-dominations and press-freedom levels to account for 
government  quality  dynamics  of  corruption-control,  government-effectiveness,  voice  and 
accountability, political-stability, regulation quality and rule of law. Findings indicate democracy 
has an edge over  autocracy while  the later  and polity  overlap.  A democracy that  takes  into 
account only the voice of the majority is better in government quality than autocracy, while a 
democracy that takes into account the voice of the minority (polity) is  worse in government 
quality than autocracy. As a policy implication, democracy once initiated should be accelerated 
to edge the appeals of authoritarian regimes and reap the benefits of time and level hypotheses. 
JEL Classification: K00; O10; P16; P43; P50
Keywords: Law; Politics; Democracy; Government Policy; Development
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1.  Introduction
A key issue in political economy is to understand how institutional arrangements shape 
policy outcomes. Development policies in Africa over the last decades could by summed up in: 
the control of corruption, government effectiveness, voice and accountability, political stability,  
rule of law and regulation quality; in two words “government quality”. There is some consensus 
on the positive relationship between democracy promotion and the production of policies and 
institutions that guarantee government quality. On the other hand some proponents assert that 
democracies have important effects on the degree of competition for public offices but otherwise 
have insignificant effects on policies towards good governance (Mulligan et al.,  2004). On a 
global scale the intriguing debate on the impact of political  regimes on institutional qualities 
remains unsolved. This leaves us with the puzzling question on the effect of democracy on the 
quality of government; especially in the African continent. As pointed out by Rothstein (2011) 
the debate could be summarized  in  the observation of Diamond (2007):  “there is  a specter  
haunting democracy in the world today. It is bad governance—governance that serves only the  
interests  of  a  narrow  ruling  elite.  Governance  that  is  drenched  in  corruption,  patronage,  
favoritism, and abuse of power. Governance that is not responding to the massive and long-
deferred  social  agenda  of  reducing  inequality  and  unemployment  and  fighting  against  
dehumanizing poverty. Governance that is not delivering broad improvement in people’s lives  
because it is stealing, squandering, or skewing the available resources” (page 199). 
This  work  therefore  aims  to  assess how  political  regimes  affect  government  quality 
dynamics in the African continent. Plainly put, it addresses the concern of whether democracies 
perform better in governance than authoritarian regimes. The remainder of the paper is organized 
as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  existing  literature.   Data  and  methodology  are  disclosed  and 
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outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis and discussion are captured by Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes.
2. Existing Literature
2.1 Theoretical highlights 
2.1.1 The demand-side of government-quality: culturalist theories.
As pointed out by Charron & Lapuente(2009), in the culturalist theoretical perspective, 
political institutions are fixed and changes in  government quality results from social preferences 
and  values.  Thus  key  players  are  ordinary  people  governed  by  cultural  values  who  are 
instrumental in determining what sort of governance they need. The prevailing values of society 
urge citizens to mount powerful collective actions that put pressure on the elite to provide good 
governance. Different social demands cannot totally explain the observed level of government 
quality. It is also necessary to account for the supply-side.
2.1.2 The supply-side of government-quality: political institutions 
Here  political  institutions  shape  the  quality  of  governance.  In  this  institutionalist 
approach, the preferences of actors following standard rational-choice assumptions are kept fixed 
and  the  variations  in  levels  of  government  quality  depend  on  how  institutions  shape  the 
incentives of individuals. This implies the key actors are rulers from one particular type (or sub-
type) of political regime. The demanders of good governance(citizens) play, if any, a minor role 
as  inhabitants  of  a  country  are  assumed  to  be  hard-working  individuals  ready  to  develop 
innovative technologies if rulers provide them with good institutions( and low corruption). 
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2.2 Quality of government 
Democracy and Good Governance or Government  Quality (hence GQ) have received 
much attention in circles dealing with developing countries. GQ is now used by many national 
development  agencies  and international  organizations  such as  the  World  Bank,  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations to explain the state of developing countries. In 
1996, the IMF declared:  "promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring  
the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling  
corruption, as essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper” (IMF, 
2005).  The components  of  this  definition  will  guide  our  conception  of  GQ through-out  this 
paper.  
2.3 Conflicts in the literature 
2.3 1 Democracy and government-quality 
There is a general agreement among scholars and policy-makers on the crucial role that 
political-regimes play in GQ. GQ or good-governance fosters social and economic development. 
An intriguing unsolved debate is that concerning the impact of political-regimes on GQ. Plainly 
put, the concern is about if democratic states affect dynamics of GQ better than authoritarian 
ones. Many theoretical initiatives have been put forward as to why democracies exhibit higher 
levels  of GQ than autocracies.  However,  empirical  evidence  is  object  of controversy on the 
subject matter. 
Thus, qualitative literature has provided exhaustive case studies depicting how corruption 
(GQ)  has  increased  (decreased)  with  the  advent  of  democracy.  This  is  the  case  of  many 
developing countries in Africa (Lemarchand, 1972), Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972), India (Wade, 
1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 1977); post 1990 communist countries like Russia (Varsee, 1997) and 
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many  Latin  American  countries  upon  different  waves  of  democratization  (Weyland,  1998). 
These have inspired a number of quantitative studies, with some confirming the contradictory 
relationship  between  democracy  and  corruption  (Harris-White  & White,  1996:  3)  and  Sung 
(2004: 179). Some studies have pointed to the existence of a non-linear relationship between 
democracy  and  GQ at  the  tender  stages  of  democratization.  However,  this  negative  impact 
becomes positive as the democracy grows. Two explanations have been put forward and tested 
independently to elucidate this non-linear relationship: the time and level hypotheses. 
Concerning  the  level of  democracy  hypothesis,  it  has  been  found  using  continuous 
measures  of  political-regimes  that  GQ  is  highest  in  strongly  democratic  states,  medium  in 
strongly authoritarian regimes and least in states that are partially democratized. Based on the 
varying empirical specifications, this level-oriented non-linearity has been defined as either U-
shaped (Montinola & Jackman, 2002), J-shaped (Back & Hadenius, 2008) or S-shaped (Sung, 
2004).   With  respect  to  time  of  exposure to or  historically  accumulated  experience  with 
democracy, Keefer (2007) shows that younger democracies produce worse GQ than older ones. 
In summary, the general idea in this literature is that partial or young democracies perform worse 
(worst) than authoritarian (full or older democratic) regimes. 
2.3.2 Democracy and growth
The link between political democracy and economic growth has been the center of debate 
in the past decades. A great chunk of cross-country research has shown a theoretical divide on 
the impact of democratic versus authoritarian regimes on growth. Both theoretical and empirical 
literatures are in antagonism over the effects of democracy on economic growth. Whereas from a 
theoretical perspective, Clague et al. (1996) and Haggard (1997) argue that democracy promotes 
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economic  growth better  than autocratic  regimes,  Rao(1984) and Blanchard  & Shleifer(2000) 
disagree. 
Advocates of democracy postulate that the motivations of citizens to work and invest; the 
effective allocation of resources in the marketplace and profit-maximization private activity can 
all  be  maintained  in  a  climate  of  liberty,  free-flowing  information  and  secured  control  of 
property (North,1990; Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu,2008).  Democracies seriously inhibit  state 
intervention  in  the  economy,  improve  responsiveness  to  public’s  demand  on  areas  such  as 
education,  justice  and  health,  and  most  importantly  encourage  long-run  and  stable  growth 
(Rodrik, 2000; Baum & Lake, 2001, 2003).
 Conversely,  opponents  of  democracy  postulate  that  democracies  lend  themselves  to 
popular demands for immediate consumption at the expense of profitable investments and can 
neither be insulated from the interest of rent-seekers nor mobilize resources swiftly. By the same 
token, democracies are said to be prone to conflicts due to social, ethnic and class struggles. 
While  some authors subscribe to authoritarian regimes in efforts  to  suppress conflicts,  resist 
sectional interests and adopt coercive measures necessary for rapid growth, others emphasize the 
central role of markets and institutions irrespective of political regime-type (Bhagwati, 1995). 
Democracy comes with a potential risk to growth because it is open to pressures from interest 
groups (Olson,  1982).  Rao (1984) postulates  that  two-thirds  of  the  world’s  population  were 
living under nondemocratic forms of government because; democratic institutions fail to respond 
to the immediate  demands of the population,  impatient  to raise its  standard of living.  In the 
investigation,  authoritarian  regimes  orchestrate  economic  growth  by  sacrificing  current 
consumption for investment, which makes them rather effective at mobilizing savings. Blanchard 
and  Shleifer  (2000)  compare  fiscal  federalism  in  China  and  Russia  to  show  that  political 
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centralization in China reduces both the risk of capture and the scope of competition for rents by 
local governments. On the other hand, the emergence of a partly dysfunctional democracy in 
transitional Russia deters economic growth due to rampant local capture and competition for 
rents. 
Shen(2002) shifts from the  cross-country mainstream approach to empirical examination 
of  the  democracy-growth nexus  and proposes  a  “before-and-after”  analytical  technique.  The 
paper  compares  the  economic  performance  of  forty  countries  before  and  after  they  became 
democracies  or  semi-democracies  over  the  last  four  decades  and  finds  evidence  that  an 
amelioration of growth performance typically follows the transformation to democracy. In line 
with the analysis, growth appears to be more stable under authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, 
rich countries often experience drops in growth after a democratic transformation while poor 
nations typically experience accelerations in growth. Growth variations appears to be negatively 
associated with initial savings ratio and positively linked to the export ratio to GDP. 
Given the debate highlighted above, Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu(2008) challenge the 
consensus  of  an  inconclusive  relationship  with  a   meta-analytic  review  and  a  quantitative 
investigation of the democracy-growth literature. They apply meta-regressions to a population of 
470 estimates obtained from 81 papers on the democracy-growth association and conclude with 
the following. (1) Relative to overall available published works, there is on average no evidence 
of democracy being detrimental to growth since the former has no direct effect on the later.  
Evidence  suggests  only  a  robust  and  significant  indirect  impact  on  growth.  (2)  Results  are 
consistent with democracies being associated with higher levels of human capital accumulation, 
lower political instability,  lower inflation and higher economic freedom. (3) Democracies are 
found to be linked to larger governments and more restrictions to international trade. (4) The 
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growth-effect  of  democratic  regimes  is  higher  in  Latin  America,  insignificant  in  Africa  and 
lower in Asia.
The  present  paper  which  aims  to  examine  the  big  questions  of  African  comparative 
politics  will  contribute  to  literature  in  the  following  dimension.  (1)  Explore  the  impact  of 
income-levels,  religious-dominations,  press-freedoms  and legal-origins  on polical-regime  and 
government-quality  dynamics.  (2)  Investigate  the  impact  of  political-regimes  on government 
quality. (3) Provide institutional policy recommendations for development needs in the African 
continent. 
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
 
We examine  a  panel  of  38  African  countries  using  data  from African  Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) ranging from 1994 to 2010. Selected variables and 
countries are presented in the appendices (Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively). In line with 
the  IMF (2005)  definition  GQ dependent  variables  include:  corruption-control,  government-
effectiveness,  voice  and  accountability,  political  stability  or  no  violence,  rule  of  law  and 
regulation  quality.  Borrowing  from Yang (2011),  independent  variables  are  political  regime 
indicators  of  democracy,  polity  and  autocracy.  Instrumental  variables  include:  legal-origins, 
press-freedoms, income-levels and religious-dominations. These instruments have been largely 
documented in the economic development literature (La Porta et al., 1997; Stulz & Williamson, 
2003; Beck et al., 2003). In the regressions we control for GDP growth, population growth and 
public investment.
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3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity
While political regimes shape the quality of institutions, the reverse effect is also true as 
stringencies in institutional quality might affect the political powers that be. For instance a probe 
into corruption allegations by an independent corruption-investigation committee might unveil 
some very nasty aspects  of government  that  could bring about  a change in political-regime, 
either by popular revolt or resignation of culprits within the regime. Thus an important issue of  
endogeneity  results  from  this  fact  which  should  be  taken  into  account  by  the  estimation 
technique to avoid biased and inconsistent estimates. 
3.2.2 Estimation Technique
Borrowing from Beck et al. (2003) and recently African law-finance literature (Asongu, 
2011ab)  the  paper  adopts  an  Instrumental  Variable  (IV)  estimation  technique.  IV  estimates 
address the puzzle of endogeneity and thus avoid the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the independent variables are correlated with the error term 
in the equation of interest. In accordance with Asongu (2011ab), the Two-Stage-Least-Squares 
(TSLS) estimation method adopted by this paper will entail the following steps.
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegalorigihannelPoliticalC )(10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ                        
                               itompressfreed )(4γ+ υα ++ itiX                                                                  (1) 
Second-stage regression:
++= itit DemocracytQualityGov )(' 10 γγ +itAutocracy)(2γ +itiXβ   µ                             (2) 
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In the two equations, X is a set of exogenous control variables. For the first and second 
equations,   v  and u, respectively represent  the error  terms.  Instrumental  variables  are legal-
origins, dominant-religions, income-levels and press-freedoms. 
We adopt the following steps in the analysis: 
-justify  the  use  of  a  TSLS-IV over  an  OLS estimation  technique  via  the  Hausman-test  for 
endogeneity;
-show that the instruments explain the endogenous components of explaining variables (political-
regime channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables);
-verify the validity of the instruments by their uncorrelation with the error-term in the equation 
of interest through an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. 
3.2.3 Robustness checks  
To ensure robustness of the analysis, the following checks will be carried out: (1) use of 
alternative indicators of political-regime and government-quality dynamics; (2) employment of 
two distinct interchangeable sets of moment conditions that encompass every dimension of the 
instruments; (3) estimation by robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
standard errors; (4) validation of TSLS estimations with Fixed Effect (FE) regressions.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
This  section  addresses  the  ability  of  exogenous  components  of  political-regimes  to 
account  for  differences  in  GQ;  the  ability  of  the  instruments  to  explain  variations  in  the 
endogenous components of political-regimes and the possibility of the instruments to account for 
GQ  beyond  political-regime  channels.  To  make  these  investigations,  we  use  the  TSLS-IV 
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estimation  technique  with  legal-origins,  press-freedoms,  income-levels  and  religious-
dominations as instrumental variables. 
4.1 Quality of government and instruments
Table  1  assesses  the  importance  of  the  instruments  in  explaining  differences  in  GQ. 
Clearly it could be observed the distinguishing African countries by legal-origins, income-levels, 
press-freedoms and religious-denominations help explain cross-countries difference in GQ. The 
instruments  taken together  enter  significantly at  the 1% significance  level  in  all  regressions. 
Broadly,  the  following  could  be  established.  (1)  English  common-law  countries  have 
substantially better  levels of GQ than their  French civil-law counterparts;  consistent with the 
law-finance (growth) literature(La Portal et al.,1997,1998; Beck et al.,2003) and recent African 
law-finance(growth)  literature(Asongu,  2011abcde;  Agbor,2011).  (2)  But  for  government-
effectiveness,  the  dominance  of  Christian  nations  over  those  of  Moslem decent  is  not  very 
significant; the significance aspect is broadly consistent with El Badawi, & Makdisi(2007).  (3) 
GQ increases with income-levels; in accordance with  Narayan et al.(2011). (4) GQ improves 
with press-freedoms; contrary to Vaidya (2005) and Oscarsson (2008).   
4.2 Political-regimes and instruments
In Table 2 we regress political-regime indicators on the instruments and test for their 
joint significance. This is the first-stage (requirement) of the IV estimation technique in which 
the endogenous components of the independent variables must be explained by the instruments, 
conditional on other covariates (control variables).  Based on results of the Fisher-statistics, it 
could be established that the instruments are strong, as in presence of control variables they enter 
jointly  significantly  into  all  regressions  at  the  1%  significance  level.  Thus,  using  those 
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instrumental dynamics in the African continent helps account for cross-country differences in the 
quality and nature of political institutions. Like in the GQ-instrument regressions, we carry-out 
two  separate  regressions  for  each  political-regime  dynamic  in  the  presence  and  absence  of 
control variables, such that we have four regressions for each dynamic. The following findings 
could  be  established.  (1)  Consistent  with  the  law-finance(growth)  literature  (La  Portal  et 
al.,1997,1998;  Beck  et  al.,2003;  Asongu,2011abcde;  Agbor,2011),  English  common-law 
countries have higher levels of democracy than their French civil-law counterparts. (2) Christian 
dominated countries have higher (lower) levels of democracy (autocracy) than Moslem-oriented 
nations;  in  accordance  with  El Badawi,  &  Makdisi  (2007). (3)  Democracy  increases  with 
income-levels: broadly in line with Narayan et al.(2011). Democratic institutions improve with 
press-freedoms; contrary to Vaidya (2005)   and Oscarsson (2008).   
4.3 The Quality of government and democracy 
Table 3 assesses two main issues: (1) the ability of political-regime channels to account 
for GQ dynamics and (2) the possibility of the instrumental variables explaining GQ dynamics 
beyond  political-regime  channels.   While  the  first  issue  is  addressed  by the  significance  of 
estimated coefficients, the second is looked at through the OIR test. The null hypothesis of this 
test is the position that the instruments account for GQ dynamics only through political-regime 
channels.  Thus  is  a  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  is  the  rejection  of  the  view  that  the 
instruments explain GQ dynamics through  no other mechanisms than political-regime channels. 
The Hausman test for endogeneity precedes every TSLS regression. The null hypothesis of this 
test is the position that OLS estimates are efficient and consistent. Therefore a rejection of the 
null hypothesis points to the issue of reverse causality (endogeneity) we highlighted earlier and 
hence lends credit to the IV estimation technique. The following measures are taken to ensure 
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goodness of fit  and robustness of estimated coefficients.  (1) For every regression, results are 
replicated using an alternative set of instrumental variables, as outlined in the second and third to 
the last lines of Table 3. (2) Robust HAC standard errors (Panel B) are used to check results of 
the TSLS of Panel A. (3) Based on the outcome of the Hausamn test, the FE regressions (which 
assume the explaining variables are correlated with the error-term) are use to further check the 
results of panels A and B.
The first issue which is addressed by the significance of estimated coefficients could be 
summarized in the following: (1) in comparison to authoritarian regimes, democratic ones have a 
more significant impact on GQ dynamics: (2) autocracy edges polity in TSLS (panels A and B) 
but both overlap in FE regressions. 
Concerning  the  second  issue,  two  interpretations  result.  (1)  The  instruments  explain 
government-effectiveness and political-stability beyond political-regime channels;  this implies 
there are  other  mechanisms by which the instruments  explain GQ dynamics  of government-
effectiveness  and political-stability  beside  political-regime  channels.  (2)  With  respect  to  the 
remaining GQ dynamics, the instruments do not explain them beyond political-regime channels; 
meaning  the  instrumental  variables  are  valid  and  not  correlated  with  the  error  term in  the 
equation  of  interest.  In  plainer  terms,  the  instruments  explain  the  remaining  GQ dynamics 
through no other mechanisms than political-regime channels. 
14
Table 1: The quality of government and instruments 
Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality Rule of  Law
Constant -1.219*** -0.260** -1.665*** -0.319*** -1.402*** 0.041 -1.614*** -0.572*** -1.156*** -0.169** -1.522*** -0.430***
(-8.868) (-2.381) (-13.86) (-3.285) (-21.17) (0.404) (-13.01) (-4.119) (-15.57) (-2.016) (-19.95) (-4.846)
Legal-
origins
English  common-law 0.193*** --- 0.317*** --- 0.149*** --- 0.119 --- 0.335*** --- 0.347*** ---
(3.624) (6.816) (3.355) (1.433) (6.757) (6.771)
French civil-law --- -0.210*** --- -0.335*** --- -0.175*** --- -0.150* --- -0.357*** --- -0.377***
(-3.778) (-6.777) (-3.325) (-1.778) (-7.033) (-7.033)
Religions
Christianity -0.010 --- 0.098* --- 0.0312 --- -0.019 --- 0.036 --- 0.002 ---
(-0.179) (1.892) (0.619) (-0.210) (0.645) (0.043)
Islam --- 0.023 --- -0.085 --- -0.005 --- 0.023 --- -0.032 --- 0.002
(0.380) (-1.533) (-0.093) (0.248) (-0.563) (0.045)
Income 
Levels
Low Income --- -0.183*** --- -0.272*** --- -0.022 --- -0.180* --- -0.068 --- -0.164***
(-2.674) (-4.456) (-0.352) (-1.839) (-1.158) (-2.633)
Middle Income 0.335*** --- 0.467*** --- 0.116* --- 0.599*** --- 0.349*** --- 0.420*** ---
(3.984) (6.346) (1.672) (4.613) (4.510) (5.258)
Lower Middle  Income -0.119 --- -0.160** --- -0.030 --- -0.404*** --- -0.271*** --- -0.242*** ---
(-1.309) (-2.009) (-0.388) (-2.762) (-3.108) (-2.687)
Upper Middle Income --- 0.288*** --- 0.338*** --- 0.320*** --- 0.594*** --- 0.407*** --- 0.437***
(3.217) (4.248) (3.769) (4.292) (4.856) (4.923)
Press 
Freedoms
Free 0.835*** --- 0.912*** --- 1.632*** --- 1.118*** --- 0.791*** --- 0.929*** ---
(10.44) (13.06) (24.12) (8.824) (10.48) (11.92)
Partly Free 0.395*** --- 0.447*** --- 0.887*** --- 0.632*** --- 0.453*** --- 0.444*** ---
(7.115) (9.213) (18.76) (7.140) (8.584) (8.158)
No Freedom --- -0.505*** --- -0.563*** --- -1.071*** --- -0.759*** --- -0.539*** --- -0.567***
(-9.368) (-11.73) (-20.99) (-9.126) (-10.69) (-10.63)
Control 
Variables
GDP Growth -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.008* -0.008* -0.006* -0.006 -0.001 --- -0.008* -0.009** -0.009** -0.010**
(-2.858) (-2.750) (-1.940) (-1.836) (-1.731) (-1.329) (-0.150) (-1.914) (-2.073) (-2.095) (-2.276)
Population Growth -0.020 -0.054 0.050 0.015 --- -0.062* --- --- --- --- --- ---
(-0.586) (-1.480) (1.620) (0.467) (-1.791)
Public Investment 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.015** 0.016** 0.047*** 0.048***
(5.556) (5.387) (5.560) (5.301) (3.684) (3.057) (6.321) (6.367) (2.389) (2.404) (6.934) (6.688)
Adjusted R² 0.475 0.430 0.601 0.549 0.742 0.655 0.409 0.387 0.499 0.471 0.569 0.521
Fisher test 34.293*** 32.128*** 56.236*** 51.261*** 123.046*** 81.255*** 30.293*** 36.656*** 43.00*** 43.950*** 56.789*** 53.700***
Observations 331 331 331 331 339 339 339 339 338 338 339 339
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.
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Table 2: First-stage regressions 
Democracy Polity Autocracy
Constant 0.150 -1.317*** 4.287*** 3.293*** -2.578*** -3.226*** 3.069*** 2.672*** 2.748*** 2.134*** 1.293*** 1.222**
(0.455) (-2.911) (10.27) (6.082) (-6.504) (-5.870) (6.025) (3.434) (8.204) (3.677) (3.158) (2.465)
Legal-
origins
English  common-law 0.660** 0.677** --- --- -0.029 -0.182 --- --- 0.710** 0.789** --- ---
(2.168) (2.163) (-0.080) (-0.480) (2.304) (2.557)
French civil-law --- --- -0.897*** -0.951*** --- --- -0.314 -0.098 --- --- -0.600* -0.837***
(-2.847) (-2.929) (-0.817) (-0.241) (-1.942) (-2.596)
Religions
Christianity 0.089 0.079 --- --- 1.167*** 1.038** --- --- -1.024*** -0.982*** --- ---
(0.275) (0.227) (3.009) (2.451) (-3.123) (-3.012)
Islam --- --- -0.039 0.047 --- --- -1.094*** -0.799* --- --- 1.000*** 0.923**
(-0.117) (0.128) (-2.663) (-1.771) (3.028) (2.517)
Income 
Levels
Low Income --- --- 0.868** 0.292 --- --- 1.536*** 1.748*** --- --- -0.644* -0.951**
(2.297) (0.725) (3.333) (3.439) (-1.738) (-2.361)
Middle Income 0.251 0.321 --- --- -1.406** -0.987 --- --- 1.590*** 1.295** --- ---
(0.508) (0.642) (-2.373) (-1.624) (3.175) (2.514)
Lower Middle  Income -0.872 -0.392 --- --- 0.228 -0.213 --- --- -1.061* -0.744 --- ---
(-1.512) (-0.664) (0.331) (-0.298) (-1.818) (-1.270)
Upper Middle Income --- --- 2.535*** 2.157*** --- --- 2.183*** 2.541*** --- --- 0.285 -0.561
(4.652) (3.853) (3.284) (3.636) (0.533) (-0.996)
Press 
Freedoms
Free 6.997*** 6.884*** --- --- 10.025*** 9.694*** --- --- -3.067*** -2.892*** --- ---
(13.64) (13.34) (16.31) (15.47) (-5.905) (-5.548)
Partly Free 3.464*** 3.185*** --- --- 4.899*** 4.420*** --- --- -1.417*** -1.369*** --- ---
(11.00) (9.567) (12.99) (10.94) (-4.444) (-4.331)
No Freedom --- --- -4.137*** -3.943*** --- --- -5.875*** -5.505*** --- --- 1.731*** 1.491***
(-13.28) (-11.99) (-15.46) (-13.53) (5.667) (4.605)
Control 
Variables
GDP Growth --- 0.020 --- --- --- -0.059** --- -0.047 --- 0.068*** --- 0.073***
(0.977) (-2.316) (-1.627) (3.164) (3.214)
Population Growth --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.423** --- 0.083 --- ---
(-1.998) (0.501)
Public Investment --- 0.188*** --- 0.188*** --- 0.166*** --- 0.151*** --- --- --- 0.021
(4.658) (4.501) (3.390) (2.885) (1.334)
Adjusted R² 0.381 0.412 0.329 0.353 0.433 0.449 0.363 0.375 0.087 0.105 0.072 0.098
Fisher test 57.936*** 44.971*** 55.447*** 46.688*** 71.792*** 52.108*** 64.355*** 38.706*** 9.905*** 9.150*** 9.721*** 8.831***
Observations 555 502 555 502 555 502 555 502 555 555 555 500
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.
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Table 3: Second-stage regressions 
Panel A:  TSLS
Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality Rule of  Law
Constant -1.320*** -1.358*** -1.514*** -1.559*** -1.259*** -1.308*** -1.467*** -1.522*** -1.375*** -1.421*** -1.701*** -1.758***
(-8.349) (-8.307) (-9.550) (-9.548) (-10.39) (-10.41) (-7.390) (-7.383) (-7.635) (-7.584) (-7.881) (-7.820)
Democracy 0.161*** --- 0.188*** --- 0.219*** 0.218*** --- 0.184*** --- 0.216*** ---
(6.921) (7.854) (12.28) (7.455) (6.980) (6.793)
Polity --- 0.166*** --- 0.194*** --- 0.225*** --- 0.225*** --- 0.191*** --- 0.223***
(6.902) (7.868) (12.19) (7.425) (6.935) (6.758)
Autocracy 0.126** 0.301*** 0.151*** 0.355*** -0.0001 0.237*** 0.149** 0.388*** 0.149** 0.352*** 0.209*** 0.447***
(2.131) (3.737) (2.665) (4.588) (-0.003) (3.888) (2.067) (3.884) (2.282) (3.874) (2.666) (4.103)
Hausman test 79.840*** 78.886*** 146.66*** 147.026*** 298.878*** 298.677*** 55.324*** 56.080*** 148.124*** 150.231*** 145.491*** 147.314***
OIR-Sargan 5.916 5.796 11.368** 11.109** 1.156 1.285 9.496** 8.871* 4.727 4.247 4.671 4.048
P-value [0.205] [0.214] [0.022] [0.025] [0.885] [0.863] [0.049] [0.064] [0.316] [0.373] [0.322] [0.399]
Cragg-Donald 2.212 2.198 3.094 3.097 2.213 2.200 2.213 2.200 2.198 2.185 2.213 0.210
Adjusted R² 0.170 0.172 0.193 0.194 0.597 0.594 0.284 0.283 0.186 0.184 0.208 0.210
Fisher 36.471*** 36.246*** 39.456*** 39.562*** 197.619*** 194.845*** 46.637*** 46.109*** 38.006*** 37.411*** 32.441*** 31.995***
Observations 362 362 352 352 370 370 370 370 369 369 370 370
Panel B:  TSLS with HAC
Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality Rule of  Law
Constant -1.320*** -1.358*** -1.514*** -1.559*** -1.259*** -1.308*** -1.467*** -1.522*** -1.375*** -1.421*** -1.701*** -1.758***
(-3.648) (-3.543) (-4.422) (-4.363) (-5.945) (-5.657) (-3.399) (-3.346) (-3.525) (-3.414) (-3.764) (3.679)
Democracy 0.161*** --- 0.188*** --- 0.219*** --- 0.218*** --- 0.184*** --- 0.216*** ---
(2.812) (3.455) (7.104) (3.456) (3.134) (3.138)
Polity --- 0.166*** --- 0.194*** --- 0.225*** --- 0.225*** --- 0.191*** --- 0.223***
(2.755) (3.430) (6.692) (3.394) (3.045) (3.087)
Autocracy 0.126 0.301* 0.151 0.355** -0.0001 0.237** 0.149 0.388* 0.149 0.352** 0.209 0.447**
(1.094) (1.719) (1.616) (2.441) (-0.002) (2.278) (0.879) (1.677) (1.291) (1.969) (1.560) (2.169)
Hausman test 79.840*** 78.886*** 146.669*** 147.026*** 298.878*** 298.677*** 55.324*** 56.080*** 148.124*** 150.231*** 145.491*** 147.314***
OIR-Sargan 5.916 5.796 11.368** 11.109** 1.156 1.285 9.496** 8.871* 4.727 4.247 4.671 4.048
P-value [0.205] [0.214] [0.022] [0.025] [0.885] [0.863] [0.049] [0.064] [0.316] [0.373] [0.322] [0.399]
Adjusted R² 0.170 0.172 0.193 0.194 0.597 0.594 0.284 0.283 0.186 0.184 0.208 0.210
Fisher 7.354*** 7.100*** 7.842*** 7.573*** 77.850*** 70.290*** 12.278*** 11.499*** 8.630*** 8.119*** 7.481*** 7.132***
Observations s 362 362 352 352 370 370 370 370 369 369 370 370
Panel C: Fixed Effects with HAC
Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality Rule of  Law
Constant -0.851*** -0.865*** -0.935*** -0.952*** -0.912*** -0.935*** -0.986*** -1.006*** -0804*** -0.817*** -0.983*** -1.001***
(-12.98) (-12.85) (-14.49) (-14.11) (-16.70) (-15.80) (-9.394) (-9.386) (-9.385) (-8.975) (-13.56) (-13.60)
Democracy 0.070*** --- 0.078*** --- 0.129*** --- 0.111*** --- 0.071*** --- 0.085*** ---
(4.098) (4.558) (11.05) (5.895) (4.270) (4.786)
Polity --- 0.072*** --- 0.080*** --- 0.132*** --- 0.114*** --- 0.073*** --- 0.087***
(4.140) (4.574) (11.14) (5.937) (4.212) (4.853)
Autocracy -0.006 0.068*** -0.009 0.074*** -0.062*** 0.075*** 0.039 0.158*** -0.0009 0.075*** 0.0008 0.092***
(-0.343) (3.590) (-0.638) (4.494) (-5.330) (5.862) (1.498) (7.702) (-0.052) (3.070) (0.046) (4.728)
Adjusted R² 0.248 0.251 0.303 0.305 0.665 0.664 0.275 0.276 0.252 0.251 0.311 0.315
Fisher 72.425*** 73.807*** 92.591*** 93.544*** 439.224*** 437.161*** 85.027*** 85.087*** 75.272*** 75.089*** 100.867*** 102.750***
Observations 434 434 422 422 442 442 442 442 441 441 442 442
Initial Instruments   Constant; Lower Middle Income; Middle Income; English; Christians; Free Press; Partly Free Press
Robust Instruments Constant; Upper Middle Income; Low Income; French; Islam; Not Free Press 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OIR: Overidentifying  Restrictions
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4.3 Further discussion of results and policy implications
4.3.1 Closeness in effects of democracy and autocracy
Closeness in effects has two main dimensions: difference effect and sign effect.
Concerning the difference  effect, it is worth pointing-out the variations between democratic and 
autocratic elasticities are significant but not quite substantial to persuade autocratic regimes on 
the appeals of democracy in GQ dynamics. As regards the sign  effect, elasticities of both types 
of political-regimes are positive; which is another indication that autocratic regimes are not quite 
detrimental at effecting GQ dynamics. 
The time and level hypotheses on the non-linear relationship between democracy and GQ 
could provide some insights into these  closeness in-effects.  The partiality or youthfulness  of 
African  democracies  renders  their  effects  on  GQ  less  pronounced:  inline  with  the  level 
(Montinola  & Jackman,  2002;  Back  & Hadenius,  2008;  Sung,  2004)  and  time  of  exposure 
(Keefer, 2007) hypotheses. 
4.3.2 The overlapping of autocracy and polity 
Polity index is  the difference  between polity's  democracy and autocracy.  The polity 
score is the aggregate of 6 component measures that aim to record what are called key qualities 
of  democracy:  executive  recruitment,  political  competition  and  constraints  on  executive 
authority.  However  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Polity’s  concept  of  democracy  is  thin.  Its 
measurement  as  the  difference  between democracy and autocracy by definition  highlights  it 
should be compared with autocracy in interpretation as a distinct measurement of democracy. 
Polity-democracy is a democracy in which the voices of the minority are considered. It follows 
that, a democracy that does not take into account the voice of the minority is better in GQ than 
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autocracy, while a democracy that takes into account the voice of the minority (polity) is worse 
in GQ than autocracy. 
4.3.3   Policy implications, caveats and limitations
A key issue in political economy is to understand how institutional arrangements shape 
policy outcomes.  In  our  analysis  we used four  moment  conditions:  press-freedoms,  income-
levels, legal-origins  and religious-dominations. In analyzing policy options we shall assume the 
first two instruments are variables while the last two are fixed. In other words religious and legal 
origins are constant. Based on our findings democracy is best at effecting GQ. However, once 
initiated, the democratization process should be accelerated in a bid to avoid polity-democracy 
and the appeals of autocracy. Early democracy should come in tandem with complete freedom of 
the press so that the benefits in GQ are substantial. Early democracy will also improve income-
levels through higher growth (Shen, 2002). Increased income-levels accompanied with press-
freedom policies will in turn improve democracy and GQ substantially. As the country matures 
in the democratization process, it will benefit by the  time and  level of exposure advantages of 
democracy which will  further  improve the GQ and growth.   Based on our  findings  and the 
literature,  the  pitfall  of  initiating  democracy remains  the  failure  to  accelerate  the  process  of 
democratization.  In  line  with  comparative  religious  instruments,  based  on  relative  religious 
elasticities of GQ, it seems Christian-dominated countries will have an edge over their Moslem 
oriented counterparts in the implementation of proposed recommendations. 
An important limitation to take into account is that studies of this kind depend to a great 
extent  on the  integrity  of the proxy for  GQ obtained from perception-based measures.  Thus 
omitted  variables  and  media-effect  may  substantially  influence  perceptions  of  GQ  and 
consequently bias the link between political-regime indicators and GQ measures. However, to 
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the best of our knowledge there are no better measurements of GQ other than those from African 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. The paper has limited the ills of this draw-back by 
using six different measures of GQ. Also the use of a methodology that accounts for endogeneity 
addresses the concerns of omitted variables and bias in the perception based measures.
5. Conclusion
The present paper which aimed to examine the big questions of African comparative 
politics has contributed to the literature with the following findings. (1) English common-law 
countries  have  substantially  better  levels  of  GQ  than  their  French  civil-law  counterparts; 
consistent with the law-finance (growth) literature(La Portal et al.,1997,1998; Beck et al.,2003) 
and recent African law-finance(growth) literature(Asongu, 2011abcde; Agbor,2011). (2) But for 
government-effectiveness, the dominance of Christian nations over those of Moslem decent is 
not very significant; but the significance is broadly consistent with El Badawi, & Makdisi(2007). 
(3) GQ increases with income-levels; in accordance with Narayan et al.(2011). (4) GQ improves 
with  press-freedoms; contrary to Vaidya  (2005) and Oscarsson (2008). (5) Consistent with the 
law-finance(growth) literature (La Portal et al.,1997,1998; Beck et al.,2003; Asongu, 2011abcde; 
Agbor,2011) English common-law countries have higher levels of democracy than their French 
civil-law  counterparts.  (6)  Christian  dominated  countries  have  higher  (lower)  levels  of 
democracy  (autocracy)  than  Moslem-oriented  nations;  El Badawi,  &  Makdisi  (2007). (7) 
Democracy increases with income-levels: broadly in line with Narayan et al.(2011). Democratic 
institutions improve with press-freedoms; contrary to Vaidya (2005) and   Oscarsson (2008). (8) 
In comparison to authoritarian regimes, democratic ones have a more significant impact on GQ 
dynamics: (9) Autocracy edges polity in TSLS but both overlap in FE regressions. (10) The 
instruments  explain  government-effectiveness  and  political-stability  beyond  political-regime 
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channels;  this  implies  there  are  other  mechanisms  by  which  the  instruments  explain  GQ 
dynamics  of government-effectiveness and political-stability beside political-regime channels. 
(11) With respect to the remaining GQ dynamics, the instruments do not explain them beyond 
political-regime channels; meaning the instrumental variables are valid and not correlated with 
the error term in the equation of interest. In plainer terms, the instruments explain the remaining 
GQ dynamics through no other mechanisms than political-regime channels.  (12) A democracy 
that takes into account only the voice of the majority is better in GQ than autocracy, while a 
democracy  that  takes  into  account  the  voice  of  the  minority  (polity)  is  worse  in  GQ than 
autocracy.
As a policy implication,  democracy once initiated,  should be accelerated (to edge the 
appeals of authoritarian regimes) and reap the benefits of time and level hypotheses.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Government 
Quality 
Control of Corruption -0.622 0.597 -2.489 1.086 445
Government Effectiveness -0.691 0.598 -1.853 0.807 433
Political Stability -0.543 0.922 -3.056 1.108 454
Regulation Quality -0.580 0.577 -2.526 0.905 453
Rule of Law -0.692 0.647 -2.312 1.053 454
Voice and Accountability -0.589 0.721 -1.951 1.047 454
Democracy
Autocracy
Democracy Index 2.725 4.214 -8.000 10.000 627
Polity Index(Revised) 1.068 5.312 -9.000 10.000 627
Autocracy Index 1.703 3.460 -8.000 9.000 627
Control 
Variables
GDP growth 4.816 6.725 -50.248 71.188 644
Population growth 2.485 0.948 -6.526 10.043 644
Public Investment 7.543 4.200 0.000 32.032 564
Instrumental 
Variables
English Common-Law 0.394 0.489 0.000 1.000 646
French Civil-Law 0.605 0.489 0.000 1.000 646
Christianity 0.710 0.453 0.000 1.000 646
Islam 0.289 0.453 0.000 1.000 646
Low Income 0.631 0.482 0.000 1.000 646
Middle Income 0.368 0.482 0.000 1.000 646
Lower Middle Income 0.236 0.425 0.000 1.000 646
Upper Middle Income 0.131 0.338 0.000 1.000 646
Press Freedom 0.136 0.343 0.000 1.000 570
Partial Press Freedom 0.384 0.486 0.000 1.000 570
No Press Freedom 0.478 0.500 0.000 1.000 570
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min : Minimum. Max : Maximum. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis     
Quality of Government Democracy Control Variables Instrumental Variables
CC Gov.E PolS R.Q R.L V&A Demo Pol Auto GDPg Popg PubI Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI Free PFree NFree
1.000 0.872 0.668 0.774 0.86 0.747 0.500 0.40 -0.03 -0.068 -0.34 0.200 0.274 -0.274 0.024 -0.12 -0.22 0.222 -0.024 0.345 0.518 0.094 -0.465 CC
1.000 0.667 0.851 0.89 0.796 0.551 0.45 -0.05 -0.006 -0.31 0.178 0.406 -0.406 0.080 -0.16 -0.31 0.310 0.006 0.422 0.558 0.116 -0.519 Gov. E
1.000 0.657 0.78 0.684 0.509 0.30 0.141 0.021 -0.22 0.287 0.145 -0.145 0.025 -0.11 -0.14 0.141 -0.113 0.345 0.427 0.136 -0.437 PolS
1.000 0.82 0.760 0.505 0.39 -0.00 -0.055 -0.26 0.067 0.385 -0.385 0.082 -0.12 -0.16 0.168 -0.114 0.383 0.502 0.160 -0.514 R..Q
1.00 0.799 0.561 0.43 0.003 -0.017 -0.31 0.229 0.361 -0.361 0.031 -0.14 -0.20 0.203 -0.086 0.398 0.536 0.113 -0.492 R.L
1.000 0.763 0.77 -0.29 -0.049 -0.26 0.128 0.270 -0.270 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.089 -0.126 0.286 0.645 0.293 -0.745 V&A
1.000 0.73 0.056 0.0341 -0.13 0.241 0.220 -0.220 0.049 -0.04 -0.01 0.018 -0.191 0.257 0.477 0.226 -0.543 Demo
1.00 -0.63 -0.069 -0.15 0.182 0.147 -0.147 0.105 -0.10 0.051 -0.051 -0.224 0.198 0.487 0.259 -0.582 Polity
1.00 0.149 0.070 0.019 0.043 -0.043 -0.09 0.098 -0.09 0.096 0.109 0.003 -0.16 -0.11 0.222 Auto
1.000 0.264 0.110 -0.03 0.035 0.011 -0.02 -0.08 0.088 -0.011 0.139 0.018 -0.05 0.036 GDPg
1.000 -0.04 -0.21 0.211 -0.10 0.153 0.322 -0.322 -0.178 -0.23 -0.24 0.063 0.107 Popg
1.000 -0.05 0.057 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.012 0.020 -0.00 0.043 0.188 -0.212 PubI
1.000 -1.000 0.085 -0.04 -0.16 0.164 0.056 0.163 0.190 0.041 -0.170 English
1.000 -0.08 0.040 0.164 -0.164 -0.056 -0.16 -0.19 -0.04 0.170 French
1.000 -0.93 -0.04 0.049 -0.154 0.264 0.07 -0.10 0.054 Christian
1.000 0.126 -0.126 0.053 -0.24 -0.09 0.068 -0.000 Islam
1.000 -1.000 -0.729 -0.50 -0.17 0.109 0.011 LIncome
1.000 0.729 0.50 0.17 -0.10 -0.011 MIncome
1.000 -0.21 -0.17 0.001 0.118 LMI
1.000 0.464 -0.15 -0.165 UMI
1.000 -0.31 -0.381 Free
1.000 -0.757 PFree
1.000 NFree
CC: Control of Corruption.  Gov. E: Government Effectiveness. PolS: Political Stability or No Violence. R.Q: Regulation Quality. R.L: Rule of Law.  V& A: Voice and Accountability.  Demo: Democracy. Pol: Polity. Auto:  
Autocracy. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubI: Public Investment. Eng: English Common-Law. Frch: French Civil-Law. Chris: Christian Religion. LI: Low Income. MI: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle  
Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. Free: Freedom of the Press. PFree: Partial Freedom of the Press. NFree: No Freedom of the Press. 
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Sign Variable Definitions Sources
Democracy Demo Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
Polity Pol Revised Combined  Polity Score World Bank(WDI)
Autocracy Auto Institutionalized Autocracy World Bank(WDI)
Public  Investment PubI Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Growth of GDP GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Control of Corruption CC Control of Corruption(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Government Effectiveness Gov. E Government Effectiveness(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Political Stability/ No Violence PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Regulation Quality R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Voice and Accountability V & A Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Press Freedom Free Freedom House Index Freedom House
WDI: World Development Indicators 
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num.
Legal-origins 
English Common-Law Botswana,  The  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Malawi, 
Mauritius,  Nigeria,  Sierra  Leone,  South  Africa,  Sudan, 
Swaziland,  Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania.
15
French Civil-Law  Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Congo  Republic,  Congo 
Democratic Republic, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon,  Guinea-Bissau,   Madagascar,   Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo. 
23
Religions Christianity 
Angola,  Benin  ,Botswana,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde, 
Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic 
Republic,  Ivory  Coast,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Gabon, 
Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, Tanzania.
27
Islam Burkina  Faso,  Chad,  The  Gambia,  Guinea-Bissau,    Mali, 
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan.
11
Income Levels
Low Income Benin ,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo  Republic,  Congo   Democratic  Republic,  Ethiopia,  The 
Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea-Bissau,   Kenya,  Madagascar,  Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda,  Sierra Leone, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania. 
24
Middle Income Angola  ,Botswana,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde,  Ivory  Coast, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland.
14
Lower Middle Income Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Nigeria, 
Sudan, Swaziland.
8
Upper Middle Income Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritius, South Africa. 5
Num: Number of cross sections(countries)
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